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The Creative Power of Nonhuman Photography 
JOANNA ZYLINSKA 
Abstract 
Living in the media-saturated society of the 21st century has become 
tantamount to being photographed on a constant basis. Our identity is 
constituted and confirmed by the ongoing flow of photo streams on our 
mobile phones, tablets and social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Tumblr, not to mention the thousands of security cameras invisibly 
registering our image when we pass through city centres, shopping malls 
and airports. This photographic process is largely automatized: it is subject 
to the logic and vision of the machine. Even the supposed human-centric 
decisions with regard to what to photograph and how to do it are often 
reactions to events quickly unfolding in front of the photographer’s eyes, or 
responses to pre-established visual categories: landscape, portraiture, play, 
war. This chapter argues that human-driven photography – involving an act 
of conscious looking through a viewfinder or at an LCD screen – is only one 
small part of what takes place in the field of photography, even though it is 
often made to stand in for photography as such. Yet, rather than contribute 
to recent jeremiads about photography – what with it being seen as 
supposedly dying in the digital era because it is no longer authentic or 
material enough, or imploding due to its excessiveness and banality as 
evidenced on Instagram and in the much maligned selfie phenomenon – it 
also suggests that it is precisely through focusing on its nonhuman aspect 
that we can find life in photography.  
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Images 1–4 (from above left). Joanna Zylinska, from the series Topia daedala, 2014. 
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Photography as philosophy 
This article offers a philosophical exposition of the concept of ‘nonhuman 
photography’. What is meant by nonhuman photography here is not just 
photos taken by agents that are not human, such as CCTV cameras, body 
scanners, space satellites or Google Street View, although some of these 
examples will be referenced throughout the piece. Yet the principal aim of 
this article is to suggest that there is more to photography than meets the 
(human) eye and that all photography is to some extent nonhuman. With 
this, no doubt still somewhat cryptic, proposition in mind, let us take a 
small detour from philosophising to look at a photographic project which 
introduces the key ideas behind this article. 
Called Topia daedala (Images 1–4), this series of twelve black and white 
photographs225 arises out of an ongoing exploration on my part of various 
forms of manufactured landscape. Taken from two vantage points on both 
sides of a window, the composite images that make up the series interweave 
human and nonhuman creativity by overlaying the outer world of cloud 
formation with the inner space of sculptural arrangement. Remediating the 
tradition of the sublime as embraced by J.M.W. Turner’s landscape 
paintings and Ansel Adams’ national park photographs, the series 
foregrounds the inherent manufacturedness of what counts as ‘landscape’ 
and of the conventions of its visual representation. Through this, Topia 
daedala performs a micro-sublime for the Anthropocene era, a period in 
which the human has become identified as a geological agent whose impact 
on the geo- and biosphere has been irreversible. It also raises questions on 
the role of plastic – as both construction material and debris – in the age of 
petrochemical urgency. 
Topia daedala is not meant to serve as a direct illustration of the concept 
of nonhuman photography this article engages with. However, it does 
introduce us to a wider problematic of human-nonhuman relations, raising 
at the same time the politico-ethical question about our human 
responsibility in the world in which the agency of the majority of actants – 
such as wind, rain or earthquake – goes beyond that of human decision or 
will, even if it may be influenced by human action. The question of human 
responsibility in the universe which is quintessentially entangled, on both a 
cellular and cosmic level (with us all being ‘made of starstuff’),226 is an 
important one. Even if we cannot be entirely sure what this fragile human 
‘we’ actually stands for, the responsibility to face, and give an account of, 
the unfoldings of this world – which is made up of human and nonhuman 
entities and relations – belongs to us humans in a singular way. 
Philosophy, in particular ethics, has typically been a way of addressing the 
225 This series was developed as a visual track for my book, Minimal Ethics for 
the Anthropocene. 226 This is a famous line by physicist Carl Sagan from his documentary TV series, 
Cosmos. 
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problem of responsibility.227 But written linear argument is only one mode 
of enquiry through which this problem can be approached. Alongside 
philosophical writing, over the recent years I have been attempting to 
experiment with other, less verbal, modes of addressing ethical and political 
issues: those enabled by art, and, more specifically, photography. These 
experiments have been driven by one overarching question: is it possible to 
practice philosophy as a form of art, while also engaging in art-making 
and photography as ways of philosophising? The reason photography may 
lend itself to this kind of cross-modal experimentation is because of its 
ontological, or world-making (rather than just representational), 
capabilities. We can turn here for support to literary critic Walter Benn 
Michaels, who, while upholding ‘the impossibility (and the undesirability) 
of simply denying the indexicality of the photograph’,228 also argues that ‘It 
is precisely because there are ways in which photographs are not just 
representations that photography and the theory of photography have been 
so important’. 229  My proposition about photography’s ontological 
capabilities entails a stronger claim than the one made by Michael Fried in 
the Conclusion to his book, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never 
Before, in which photography as practiced by representatives of what Fried 
calls ‘the anti-theatrical tradition’ such as Jeff Wall, Thomas Struth or 
Berndt and Hilda Becher is positioned as ‘an ontological medium’, because 
it ‘makes a positive contribution’ to ontological thought via its engagement 
with issues such as absorption and worldhood. 230  While for Fried 
photography just makes philosophy better, my claim in this article is that 
photography makes philosophy, full stop – and also, more importantly, 
that photography makes worldhood, rather than just commenting on it. 
It may seem at this point that what was meant to be an account of 
nonhuman photography is revealing itself to be quite strongly attached to 
the concept of the human – as philosopher, photographer or art critic. This 
is true, because there is nothing more humanist than any unexamined 
singular gesture of trying to ‘move on beyond the human’. My ambition 
here, as in my other work, is therefore to explore the possibility of 
continuing to work with the concept of the human in the light the  
227 In my books Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene (Open Humanities Press, 
Ann Arbor, 2014), Bioethics in the Age of New Media (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
2009) and The Ethics of Cultural Studies (Continuum, London and New York, 
2005) I explored this question of responsibility by taking some steps towards 
outlining a non-prescriptive, non-moralistic, content-free ethics. 228 W B Michaels, ‘Photographs and Fossils’, in Photography Theory, J Elkin 
(ed.), Routledge, New York and London, 2007, p. 447. 229 Michaels, p. 445. 230 M Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 2008, p. 347. 
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posthumanist critique,231 taking the latter seriously as both an injunction 
and a set of possibilities. The reasons for this proposed retention of the 
human have nothing to do with any kind of residual humanism or species 
nostalgia. Instead, they spring from the recognition of a strategic role of the 
concept of the human in any kind of artistic, creative, political or ethical 
project worth its salt, while also remaining aware of the fact that in many 
works of recent posthumanist theory the human has been successfully 
exposed as nothing more than a fantasy of unity and selfhood. This fantasy 
has been premised on the exclusion of the human’s dependency, both 
material and conceptual, on other beings and non-living entities. Seen as 
too Eurocentric and masculinist by postcolonial and feminist theory, the 
human has also been revealed by various sciences to be just an arbitrary cut 
off point in the line of species continuity on the basis of characteristics 
shared across the species barrier: communication, emotions or tool use. 
This (non- or posthumanist) human this article retains as the anchor point 
of its enquiry is thus premised on the realisation that we are in 
(philosophical) trouble as soon as we start speaking about the human, but it 
also shows a certain intransigence that makes (some of) us hang on to the 
vestiges of the concept that has structured our thinking, philosophy and art 
for many centuries. So, onto a posthumanist theory of nonhuman 
photography, as articulated by a human, all too human, philosopher-
photographer… 
Towards nonhuman photography (and all the way back) 
By way of contextualising our discussion of nonhuman photography, I want 
to look at two important texts in photography theory in which the 
relationship between human and nonhuman agents, technologies and 
practices has been addressed explicitly: a 2008 essay by John Tagg titled 
‘Mindless Photography’ and a 2009 book by Fred Ritchin titled After 
Photography. Tagg’s essay is a commentary on the supposed withering of 
the critical paradigm in both photographic practice and its interpretation, a 
paradigm articulated by Victor Burgin in his 1984 seminal text Thinking 
Photography and subsequently adopted by many scholars and students of 
photography. In his article Tagg references two then recent phenomena 
which, in his view, had radically altered the relationship between 
photography and the human: the CCTV system introduced in 2003 to 
231 Although the tradition of posthumanist critique in the humanities extends as 
far back as at least the work of Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud, and includes 
writings by authors such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Donna 
Haraway, some of the recent key texts that critically expound the concept of 
posthumanism include: N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: 
Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1999; Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism?, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009; Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, Polity, Cambridge, 2013; 
and Stefan Herbrechter, Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis, Bloomsbury, 
London, 2013. 
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monitor the implementation of congestion charge in central London and 
the visual rendering of data captured by a radio telescope, in June 2005, of 
solar dust cloud radiation in the Taurus Molecular Cloud, with the data 
representing an event that ‘took place in 1585, or thereabouts’.232 While in 
the 1970s and early 1980s ‘photography was framed as a site of human 
meanings that called the human into place’, the more recent developments 
cited by Tagg are said to have undermined ‘this confident assumption’.233 
Tagg seems disturbed by the fact that, in the London traffic surveillance 
system, the relationship between the embodied human subject and the 
technical apparatus has been irrevocably broken, with the technological 
circuit which consists of ‘cameras, records, files and computers’234 doing 
away with visual presentation, ‘communication, psychic investment, a 
subject, or even a bodily organ’235 – until the visual data concerning the car 
with a given number plate that has missed the congestion charge payment 
reaches the court. Tagg is similarly troubled by the severance of the 
relationship between photography and human sensation, between stimulus 
and response, in space photography. He goes so far as to suggest that in 
those new technological developments 
photography loses its function as a representation of the ego and 
the eye and even as a pleasure machine built to excite the body. In 
place of those figures, photography is encountered as an utterly 
dead thing; mindless in a much blunter sense than imagined [by 
Burgin] twenty-five years ago… [It is] driving towards a systemic 
disembodiment that, accelerating in the technologies of 
cybernetics and informatics, has sought to prepare what has been 
hailed as the ‘postbiological’ or ‘posthuman’ body for its insertions 
into a new machinic enslavement.236 
Photography which is unable to provide stimulation and pleasure for the 
human is then immediately linked by Tagg with mindlessness, emptiness 
and, ultimately, death. It may seem that, with this articulation, Tagg is 
engaging in a belated attempt to rescue photography from its long-standing 
association with mortality established by canonical texts such as Roland 
Barthes’ Camera Lucida, and to retrospectively postulate the possibility of 
photography acting as a life-giving force. However, this no doubt radical 
possibility, briefly hinted at in the above cited passage, is immediately 
withdrawn. Photography does not deliver life to the human any more and, 
for Tagg, it is only the human that can be both life’s subject and its arbiter. 
This is of course a familiar philosophical gesture, first enacted by Aristotle, 
232 J Tagg, ‘Mindless Photography’, in Photography: Theoretical Snapshots, J J 
Long, A Noble and E Welch (eds), Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 
21. 233 Ibid., p. 24. 234 Ibid., p. 19. 235 Ibid., p. 21. 236 Ibid., p. 25. 
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whereby technology is reduced to a mere tool for human existence, survival 
or improvement and is then assessed on the basis of how well it performs 
this function (rather than being understood as a dynamic network of forces 
the way Michel Foucault and Bernard Stiegler respectively suggest, or as an 
‘intrinsic correlation of functions’237 between the human and the apparatus 
the way Vilém Flusser apprehends it). Conceived in these instrumental 
terms, as the human’s opponent and enemy – and not part of the originary 
techno-logic that brings forth the human in the world, and the world itself 
as a space occupied by human and nonhuman entities – photography must 
inevitably fail. 
It would be unfair not to mention the political motivation that underpins 
Tagg’s argument. His concern with ‘machinic enslavement’ is driven by 
what he sees as the deprivation of the human subject of both corporeal 
integrity and political subjectivity as a result of the encroachment of those 
new photoimaging technologies, in which ‘there is nothing to be seen’, on 
our lives.238 This concern no doubt becomes even more pressing in the era 
of global networked surveillance enacted by the likes of the NSA, GCHQ, 
Facebook and Google. Yet to blame photography for the immoral and 
inhumane actions of its users is to misidentify the enemy, while also 
weakening the power of a political critique developed in its ambit. In his 
essay Tagg takes some significant steps towards analysing the changes 
occurring to photographic practice at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century but then recoils in horror from the brink of his own analysis. What 
could have served as a stepping stone towards developing both a radical 
posthumanist photography theory and a radical posthumanist political 
analysis ends up retreating into a place of melancholia for the human of 
yesteryear, one who was supposedly in control of both his personal body 
and the body politic but who can now only tilt at windmills – which are 
turning into drones in front of his very eyes.  
If only Tagg had allowed himself to hear the exhortation from another 
photography theory radical, Fred Ritchin! Admittedly, Ritchin’s work is not 
free from a sense of melancholia espoused by Tagg: in After Photography 
Ritchin clearly reveals how he misses the time when people believed in 
images and when images could be used to solve conflict and serve justice. 
Yet, even though his book opens up with a rather dispiriting account of the 
changes occurring to the photographic medium and its representationalist 
ambitions, it ends with an affirmation of life in photography. Dazzled by 
the horizon of scale opened by telescopy and physics in a similar way Tagg 
was, Ritchin nevertheless admits that ‘in the digital-quantum world, it 
might be just possible … to use an emerging post-photography to delineate, 
document, and explore the posthuman. To dance with ambiguity. To 
237 Cited from a letter written by Flusser in S Zielinski, [… After the Media], 
Univocal, Minneapolis, 2013, p. 114. Zielinski explains that, for Flusser, ‘the 
apparatus does what the human wants it to do, and the human can only want 
what the apparatus is able to do’, p. 114. 238 Tagg, p. 24. 
The Creative Power of Nonhuman Photography 
139 
introduce humility to the observer, as well as a sense of belonging. To say 
yes, and simultaneously, no’.239 
(Always) nonhuman photography 
It is precisely in this critical-philosophical spirit, of saying yes and, 
simultaneously, no, that my opening proposition that all photography is to 
some extent nonhuman should be read. While I am aware of, and 
concerned with, ways in which the nonhuman aspect of photography can 
produce inhumane practices, I also want to suggest that it is precisely in its 
nonhuman aspect that photography’s creative, or world-making, side can be 
identified. Therefore, rather than contribute to recent jeremiads about 
photography, what with it being seen as supposedly dying in the digital era 
because it is no longer authentic or material enough, or imploding due to its 
excessiveness and banality as evidenced on Instagram and in the much 
maligned selfie phenomenon, I want to argue in what follows that it is 
precisely through focusing on its nonhuman aspect that we can find life in 
photography. This line of argument is partly indebted to the work of 
Flusser, who, in Towards a Philosophy of Photography writes: ‘The 
photographic apparatus lies in wait for photography; it sharpens its teeth in 
readiness. This readiness to spring into action on the part of apparatuses, 
their similarity to wild animals, is something to grasp hold of in the attempt 
to define the term etymologically’.240  Flusser builds here on the Latin 
origins of the term ‘apparatus’, which derives from apparare, ‘make ready 
for’ (as a combination of the prefix ad-, ‘toward’, and parare, ‘make ready’). 
This leads him to read photography as facilitated by, or even proto-
inscribed in, the nexus of image-capture devices, various chemical and 
electronic components and processes, as well as sight- and technology-
equipped humans.  
Flusser’s proposition challenges the humanist narrative of invention as an 
outcome of singular human genius: it recognises the significance of the 
technological set-up in the emergence of various human practices. This is 
not to say that these practices function outside the human but rather that 
the concepts of self-contained human intentionality and sovereign human 
agency may be too limited to describe the emergence of specific 
technological processes at a particular moment in time. Flusser’s idea 
seems to be (unwittingly) reflected in Geoffrey Batchen’s proposition 
outlined in Burning with Desire that photography was invented – 
seemingly repeatedly, by Nicéphore Niépce, Louis Daguerre, Hyppolyte 
Bayard and William Fox Talbot, among others – due to the fact that in the 
early nineteenth century there already existed a desire for it. This desire 
239 F Ritchin, After Photography, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2009, p. 
183. 240 V Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, Reaktion Books, London, 
2000, pp. 21-22. 
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manifested itself in the proliferation of the discourses and ideas about the 
possibility of capturing images and fixing them, and of the technologies – 
‘the camera obscura and the chemistry necessary to reproduce’ 241  the 
images taken with it – that would facilitate such a development. We could 
therefore perhaps go so far as to say that the photographic apparatus, which 
for Batchen contains but also exceeds a discrete human component, was 
awaiting the very invention of photography. 
The above discussed ideas on the photographic apparatus will eventually 
point me not just towards rethinking the photographic medium but also 
towards a possibility (one that has been withheld by Tagg) of a 
posthumanist political analysis. For now, taking inspiration from Flusser, I 
want to suggest that human-driven photography – where an act of 
conscious looking through a viewfinder or, more frequently nowadays, at an 
LCD screen held at arm’s level – is only one small part of what goes on in 
the field of photography, even though it is often made to stand in for 
photography as such. The execution of human agency in photographic 
practice, be it professional or amateur, ostensibly manifests itself in 
decisions about the subject matter (the ‘what’) and about ways of capturing 
this subject matter with a digital or analogue apparatus (the ‘how’). Yet in 
amateur, snapshot-type photography these supposed human-centric 
decisions are often affective reactions to events quickly unfolding in front of 
the photographer’s eyes. Such reactions happen too quickly, or we could 
even say automatically, for any conscious processes of decision-making to 
be involved – bar that original decision to actually have, bring and use a 
camera, rather than not. This automatism in photography also manifests 
itself in the fact that these kinds of ‘snap’ reactions are usually rechanneled 
through a whole database of standardised, pre-programmed, pre-existing 
image-frames, whose significance we are already familiar with and which 
we are trying to recreate in a unique way, under the umbrella of so-called 
individual experience: ‘toddler running towards mother’; ‘girl blowing a 
candle on a birthday cake’; ‘couple posing in front of the Taj Mahal’. It is in 
this sense that, as Flusser has it, ‘weddings conform to a photographic 
program’.242  
Similar representationalist ambitions accompany many professional 
photographic activities, including those undertaken by photojournalists 
who aim to show us, objectively and without judging, what war, poverty and 
‘the pain of others’, to borrow Susan Sontag’s phrase,243 are ‘really’ like, or 
those performed by photographic artists. Even prior to any moment of 
making a picture actually occur, fine art photographers tend to remain 
invested in the modernist idea of an artist as a human agent with a 
241 G Batchen, Burning with Desire: The Conception of Photography, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 25. 242 V Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 2001, p. 56.  243 See S Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, Picador, New York, 2003. 
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particular vocation, one whose aesthetic and conceptual gestures are aimed 
at capturing something unique, or at least capturing it uniquely, with an 
image-making device. And thus we get works of formal portraiture; images 
of different types of vegetation or geological formations that are made to 
constitute ‘landscapes’; still-life projects of aestheticised domesticity, 
including close-ups of kitchen utensils, fraying carpets or light traces on a 
wall; and, last but not least, all those works that can be gathered into that 
rag-bag called ‘conceptual photography’.244 In this way, images inscribe 
themselves in a cybernetic loop of familiarity, with minor variations to style, 
colour and the (re)presented object made to stand for creativity, originality 
or even ‘genius’. 
The automated image 
Through the decisions of artists and amateurs about their practice, 
photography becomes an act of making something significant, even if not 
necessarily making it signify something in any straightforward way. It is a 
practice of focusing on what is in its very nature multifocal, of literally 
casting light on what would have otherwise remained obscure, of carving a 
fragment from the flow of life and turning it into a splinter of what, post-
factum, becomes known as ‘reality’. Traditionally, this moment of selection 
– referred to as ‘decisive’ by followers of the documentary tradition in
photography – was associated with the pressing of the button to open the 
camera’s shutter. However, with the introduction of the Lytro camera on to 
the market in 2012, the temporality of this seemingly unique and transient 
photographic moment has been stretched into both the past and the future. 
Lytro captures the entire light field rather than a single plane of light, thus 
allowing the photographer to change and readjust the focus on a computer 
in postproduction. Interestingly, Lytro is advertised as ‘The only camera 
that captures life in living pictures’ – a poetic formulation which is 
underpinned by the ongoing industry claim to ‘absolute novelty’, but which 
merely exacerbates and visualises the inherent instability of all 
photographic practice and all photographic objects. Lytro is thus just one 
more element in the long-term humanist narrative about ‘man’s dominion 
over the earth’, a narrative that drives the progressive automatisation of 
many of our everyday devices, including cameras, cars and refrigerators. 
244  There are of course many ways of systematising art photography, with 
additional categories and subcategories – such as ‘abstraction’, ‘architecture’ or 
‘nude’ – being frequently listed. The quick typology proposed here does not aim 
to be comprehensive or scholarly: rather, my aim is to highlight the traditional 
categories frequently used by professional fine art photography exhibition and 
competitions, as well as amateur artist photo hosting sites. The last category, 
‘conceptual photography’, is perhaps the most open and the most contentious. I 
am using the term here in the expanded sense it has gained on many art 
photography websites. To cite from one of them, Fotoblur (www.fotoblur.com), 
conceptual photography is a ‘genre of photography in which the artist makes a 
photograph of a concept or idea’.  
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Giving us an illusion of control over technology by making cameras smaller 
and domestic equipment more user-friendly, the technoscientific industry 
actually exacerbates the gap between technology and the human by 
relieving us from the responsibility of getting to know and engage with the 
increasingly software-driven ‘black boxes’. 
Image 5. An example from Véronique Ducharme's series Encounters consisting of images 
taken by automatic hunting cameras.  
In the light of the dominance of the humanist paradigm in photography, a 
paradigm that is premised on the supposed human control of both the 
practice of image-making and the equipment, it is important to ask what 
gets elided in such conceptualisations. Of course, I am not the only one who 
is asking this question: the problem of nonhuman agency in photography 
has been explored by other theorists, artists and curators. One recent 
photography event that brought many of these ideas to the fore was 
Drone: The Automated Image, a series of shows taking place under the 
umbrella of the photography biennale Le Mois de la Photo in Montreal, 
curated by Paul Wombell, in 2013.245 The uniqueness of this 13th edition of 
the Montreal biennale lay not so much in highlighting the machinic aspect 
of photographic and video practice, as this aspect had already been 
mobilised in the early days of photography – for example, in the works of 
Alexander Rodchenko or László Moholy-Nagy. Drone: The Automated 
245 This article arises out of a catalogue essay I wrote for this exhibition: J 
Zylinska, ‘All the World’s a Camera: Notes on Nonhuman Photography’, in 
Drone: The Automated Image, Paul Wombell (ed.), Kerber, Bielefeld, 2013. 
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Image (which was concerned with much more than just drones) took one 
step further on this road towards not just nonhuman but also posthumanist 
photography by actually departing from the human-centric visualisation 
process. In many of the works shown, the very act and process of capture 
were relegated to a computer, a camera mounted atop a moving vehicle, a 
robot or a dog. To mention just one example, Canadian artist Véronique 
Ducharme presented a photography-based installation called Encounters, 
consisting of images taken by automatic hunting cameras (Image 5). As the 
artist herself explains, 
Over the course of one year, automatic cameras, installed in 
various parts of the Quebec landscape, recorded images from the 
forest. The images included animals, sunrise, wind and other 
actants susceptible of triggering the shutter of the cameras. These 
digital images, including the ‘mistakes’ of the cameras (i.e., 
blacked-out or overexposed images) were then transferred onto 
slide film in order to be projected in the gallery space using slide 
projectors. Accompanied by its rhythmic mechanical click, each 
machine has been programmed to sporadically and 
unpredictably project the images around the space, leaving the 
viewer entangled within the dialogue created by the machines 
and the images.246 
Ducharme’s project offers a thought-provoking intervention into the debate 
about (human) intentionality in photography theory, whereby the former is 
seen as a condition and a guarantee of the medium being considered a form 
of art.247 Photographic agency is distributed here amongst a network of 
participants, which includes not just nonhuman but also inanimate actors – 
even if ‘the beholder’ of the installation is still envisaged to be a human 
gallery-goer. 
Ducharme’s work has similarities with another project which foregrounds 
and remediates nonhuman photographic agency without reneging on its 
human dimension: Stolen Images by British photographer Juliet Ferguson 
(Image 6), published in the London independent photography magazine 
Flip in 2012 and online in Photomediations Machine in 2013. Accessing 
CCTV cameras using appropriate search terms via Google as part of her 
journalism job, Ferguson was able ‘to see through the all-seeing eyes of the 
CCTV camera places’248 what she would not have access to in the real world 
– without leaving her sofa. The process led her to reflect ‘on what it means
to take a photograph’ and to pose the following questions: ‘The majority of 
246 V Ducharme, Encounters, 15.02.2014, Photomediations Machine,  
http://photomediationsmachine.net/2014/02/15/encounters/ 247 For the exposition of this argument, developed in response to the work of 
Michael Fried on the work of Thomas Demand, see Michaels, pp. 443-44. 248 J Ferguson, Stolen Images, 29.04.2013, Photomediations Machine,  
http://photomediationsmachine.net/2013/04/29/stolen-images 
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the cameras I used I could pan, zoom and focus. Is this any less 
photography than someone using a fully automatic camera and taking a 
picture from a designated panorama point at a beauty spot? Does 
photography demand a presence or are photographs taken using 
appropriated cameras controlled from another country in another time 
zone just as valid as “created” images?’.249 Ferguson has revealed that, in 
the process, she began ‘to see a certain beauty in the images as they became 
removed from their original intention of surveillance. Instead, they offered 
a unique perspective on the ebb and flow of a day, from a vantage point and 
rigidity that ordinary photography doesn’t offer’.250 
Image 6. An example from Juliet Ferguson's series Stolen Images created with CCTV 
cameras. 
The photographic condition 
These two projects discussed above demonstrate that art practice is merely 
part of a wider photographic condition, with things photographing 
themselves, without always being brought back to the human spectrum of 
vision as the ultimate channel of perception and of things perceived. 
Naturally, humans form part of this photographic continuum – as artists, 
photojournalists, festival organisers, computer programmers, engineers, 
printers, Instagram users, and, last but not least, spectators. However, what 
the examples just presented make explicit is that we are all part of that 
photographic flow of things being incessantly photographed, and of trying 
to make interventions from within the midst of it. In this way, Ducharme’s 
and Ferguson’s projects fall into a category that we might term 
‘insignificant photography’ – not in the sense that they are mindless (as 
Tagg would perhaps have it), irrelevant and of no consequence, but rather 
249 Ibid. 250 Ibid. 
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in the sense of allowing us to see things that have been captured almost 
incidentally and in passing, with the thematic ‘what’ not being the key 
impulse behind the execution of the images. It is worth emphasising that 
this idea of insignificant photography has not just come to the fore with the 
development of networked digital technologies but was actually present in 
the early discourse of photography, even if the latter tended to confine 
photography’s nonhuman aspect to the fairly conservative idea of ‘objective 
observation’. Steve Edwards explains that 
Throughout its history, the camera has repeatedly been seen as 
an objective machine that captures information without any 
interference from the artist. … in the early years of photography 
this was an often repeated theme: it was assumed that the sun 
made the picture, or the camera did, or even that the object in 
question depicted itself (Talbot spoke of his country pile, Lacock 
Abbey, as the first building ‘that was ever yet known to have 
drawn its own picture’).251  
The separation between the mechanism of photography as ‘objective 
observation’ and the human-centric notion of the ‘intentionality’ of the 
photographer has been used as a disciplinary device in art history: as 
signalled before, the elevation of photography to the status of art has been 
premised upon it. 252  It is this separation that the work of many 
contemporary photographers such as Ducharme and Ferguson troubles to a 
significant extent. 
So what is meant by this notion of photographic condition, and does the 
postulation of its existence stand up to philosophical and experiential 
scrutiny? To explore these questions, let us start from a very simple 
proposition: there is life in photography. If living in the so-called media age 
has become tantamount to being photographed on a permanent basis, with 
our identity constituted and verified by the ongoing development of our 
photo galleries and photo streams on mobile phones, tablets and social 
media platforms such as Facebook, Tumblr and Pinterest, not to mention 
the thousands of security cameras quietly and often invisibly registering our 
image when we pass through city centres, shopping malls and airports, 
then, contrary to its more typical Barthesian association with the passage of 
time and death, photography can be understood more productively as a life-
making process. As Sarah Kember and I argue in Life after New Media, it is 
‘precisely in its efforts to arrest duration, to capture or still the flow of life – 
beyond singular photographs’ success or failure at representing this or that 
referent – that photography’s vital forces are activated’.253  Photography 
251 S Edwards, Photography: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2006, p. 19. 252 Fried’s Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before espouses this point 
of view. 253 S Kember and J Zylinska, Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 72. 
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lends itself to being understood in a critical vitalist framework due to its 
positioning in a network of dynamic relations between present and past, 
movement and stasis, flow and cut. In making cuts into duration, in 
stabilising the temporal flow into entities, photography is inherently 
involved with time. Significantly, for vitalist philosophers such as Henri 
Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, time, duration and movement stand precisely 
for life itself. As Bergson provocatively asks, ‘But is it not obvious that the 
photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already developed in 
the very heart of things and at all the points of space?’.254 Photography’s 
proximity to life is therefore revealed in its temporal aspect, which is 
enacted in photography’s dual ontology, whereby it can be seen as both 
object and practice, as both snapshot and all the other virtual snapshots 
that could have potentially been there, and, last but not least, as both being 
something here and now and as something always unfolding into something 
else. It is also in this dual ontology that the nonhuman side of photography 
comes to the fore, enacted as it is through agents as diverse as CCTV, aerial 
camera systems, satellites, endoscopy equipment and webcams as well as 
camera and mobile-phone-sporting humans. It is perhaps worth making a 
quick reservation here that, to acknowledge the life-making aspect of 
photography is not necessarily to condone the politically suspicious yet 
increasingly widespread technologies of ubiquitous surveillance, control 
and loss of privacy enabled by various kinds of cameras. However, much 
has already been written about the latter, with little acknowledgement so 
far of the vital potentiality of photography – which, in an ontological sense, 
does not have to be agent of control, even if it often is. There is therefore a 
danger of moralising photography in academic and public discourses before 
its potential has been truly explored. The foregrounding of the inherently 
creative power of photography as a practice is part of the philosophical 
argument of this article, although issues of politics never disappear from its 
agenda. 
Photography and life 
The on-off activity of the photographic process, which carves life into 
fragments while simultaneously reconnecting them to the imagistic flow, 
may allow us to conclude not only that there is life in photography, but also 
that life itself is photographic. Interestingly, Claire Colebrook explains this 
process of creative becoming in and of life by drawing on the very concept 
of image production, or ‘imaging’. She writes: ‘All life, according to Bergson 
and to Deleuze after him, can be considered as a form of perception or 
“imaging” where there is not one being that apprehends or represents 
another being, but two vectors of creativity where one potential for 
differentiation encounters another and from that potential forms a 
254 H Bergson, Matter and Memory, George Allen & Unwinn Ltd., London, 1911, 
p. 31. 
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relatively stable tendency or manner’.255 This idea has its root in Bergson’s 
Matter and Memory, where our experience of the world, which is always a 
way of sensing the world, comes in the form of images. We should mention 
here that, on the whole, Bergson is somewhat hesitant about the role played 
by images in cognition: in Creative Evolution he dismisses them as mere 
‘snapshots’ of perception, post-factum reductions of duration and time to a 
sequence of the latter’s frozen slices.256 It may therefore seem strange to be 
revisiting the work of a philosopher who only used the concept of 
photography negatively, to outline a ‘better’, i.e. more intuitive and more 
fluid, mode of perception and cognition, in an attempt to say something 
new about photography. However, my argument here, as in my previous 
work,257 is that Bergson’s error is first and foremost media-specific and not 
philosophical per se: namely, he misunderstands photography’s inherently 
creative and dynamic power by reducing it to a sequence of already 
fossilised artefacts, with the mind fragmenting the world into a sequence of 
‘snapshots’. This is why I want to suggest that, its mystical underpinnings 
aside, we can mobilise Bergson’s philosophical writings on duration 
understood as a manifestation of élan vital to rethink photography as a 
quintessential practice of life. Indeed, photography is one possible (and 
historically specific) enactment of the creative practice of imaging, with the 
cuts into duration it makes always remaining connected to the flow of time. 
If we accept the fact that cutting – be it with our visual or conceptual 
apparatus – is inevitable to the processes of making sense of the world, then 
we can see any outcomes of the photographic cut, i.e. photographs and 
other products of the image-making process, as temporary stabilisations of 
the flow of duration that still bear a trace of life – rather than as frozen and 
ultimately deadly mementoes of the past. It is important to point out that, 
in order to recognise any kind of process as a process, we need to see it 
against the concept of a temporary stabilisation, interruption or cut into 
this process. A photograph is one possible form such stabilisations take, 
and a rather ubiquitous one at that. It is precisely because of its ubiquity 
and its increasingly intuitive technological apparatus that it serves as a 
255 C Colebrook, Deleuze and the Meaning of Life, Continuum, London and New 
York, 2010, p. 11. 256 Bemoaning our suppression of intuition – which can offer us a more accurate 
and less fragmented picture of the world – Bergson highlights our overreliance on 
the intellect in the cognitive process: "Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner 
becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their 
becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, 
as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a 
becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of 
knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming 
itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we 
would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything 
else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us." [H Bergson, Creative 
Evolution, Random House, The Modern Library, New York, 1944 (first published 
in 1911), p. 362.] 257 This section develops some of the ideas discussed in chapter 3 of Kember 
and Zylinska, Life After New Media.  
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perfect illustration of Bergson’s ideas – or rather, of my own ‘differentiated 
reading’ of Bergson. Bergson himself foregrounds this mutually constitutive 
relationship between process and stoppage when he says that ‘Things are 
constituted by the instantaneous cut which the understanding practices, at 
a given moment, on a flux of this kind, and what is mysterious when we 
compare the cuts together becomes clear when we relate them to the 
flux’.258 This supposition allows us to posit photography as an ultimately 
salutary and creative force in managing the duration of the world by the 
human as a species with limited cognitive and sensory capacity.  
The notion of the creative role of the imaging process in life has also 
recently made its manifestation in the work of radical biologists, such as 
Lynn Margulis. As she puts it in a book co-authored with her son Dorian 
Sagan, ‘All living beings, not just animals, but plants and microorganisms, 
perceive. To survive, an organic being must perceive – it must seek, or at 
least recognize, food and avoid environmental danger’. 259  This act of 
perception, which involves the seeking out and recognition of something 
else, involves the making of an image of that something else (food, 
predator, sexual partner), one that needs to be at least temporarily fixed in 
order for the required proximity – for consumption or sex – to be 
accomplished. We could perhaps therefore suggest that imaging is a form of 
proto-photography, planting the seed of the combined human-machinic 
‘desire’ explored by Batchen that came to its own in the early nineteenth 
century. After Bergson, images (which are not yet photographs) stand for ‘a 
certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing – an 
existence placed half-way between the “thing” and the “representation”’.260 
It is precisely through images that novelty comes into the world, which is 
why images should not be reduced to mere representations but should 
rather be understood as creations, ‘some of which are philosophical, some 
artistic, some scientific’.261 To put this another way, the creative impulse of 
life takes it beyond representation as a form of picturing what already 
exists: instead, life is a creation of images in the most radical sense, a way of 
temporarily stabilising matter into forms. Photographic practice as we 
conventionally know it, with all the automatism it entails, is just one 
instantiation of this creative process of life.  
If all life is indeed photographic, the notion of the photographic apparatus 
that embraces yet also goes beyond the human becomes fundamental to our 
understanding of what we have called the photographic condition. To speak 
of the photographic apparatus is of course not just to argue for a 
straightforward replacement of the human vision with a machinic one, but 
rather to recognise the mutual intertwining and co-constitution of the 
258 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 272. 259 L Margulis and D Sagan, What Is Life?, University of California, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 2000, p. 27. 260 Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. vii. 261 Colebrook, Deleuze, p. 23. 
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organic and the machinic, the technical and the discursive, in the 
production of vision, and hence of the world. In her work on the use of 
apparatuses in physics experiments, the philosopher and quantum physicist 
Karen Barad argues that such devices are not just ‘passive observing 
instruments; on the contrary, they are productive of (and part of) 
phenomena’.262 We could easily apply this argument to photography, where 
the camera as a viewing device, the photographic frame both in the 
viewfinder and as the circumference of a photographic print, the enlarger, 
the computer, the printer, the photographer (who, in many instances, such 
as surveillance or speed cameras, is replaced by the camera-eye), and, last 
but not least, the discourses about photography and vision that produce 
them as objects for us humans are all active agents in the constitution of a 
photograph. In other words, they are all part of what we understand by 
photography.  
Becoming a camera 
Image 7. An example from Lindsay Seers's series It Has To Be This Way, 2009. 
As signalled earlier, it is not just philosophy that help us envisage this 
nonhuman, machinic dimension of photography: photographic, and, more 
broadly, artistic practice is even better predisposed to enact it (rather than 
just provide an argument about it). A series of works by British artist 
Lindsay Seers is a case in point. Exhibited, among other places, at Matt’s 
Gallery in London as It Has To Be This Way in 2009, and accompanied by 
an aptly titled book, Human Camera, Seers’ ongoing project consists of a 
262  K Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning,: Duke University Press, Durham, 2007, p. 
142. 
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number of seemingly autobiographic films. These are full of bizarre yet just-
about-believable adventures occurring to their heroine, all verified by a 
body of ‘experts’ – from doctors and critics through to family members – 
that appear in the films but also leave behind ‘evidence’ in the form of 
numerous written accounts, photographs and documentary records. In one 
of the films, a young girl, positioned as ‘Lindsay Seers’, is living her life 
unable to make a distinction between herself and the world, or between the 
world and its representations. The girl is gifted with exceptional memory so, 
like a camera that is permanently switched on, she records and remembers 
practically everything. ‘It is as if I was in a kaleidoscope, a bead in the 
mesmerising and constantly shifting pattern. Everything was in flux, every 
single moment and every single object rewritten at every turn’, as ‘Lindsay 
Seers’ recalls in a short piece called ‘Becoming Something’ included in 
Human Camera.263 This terrifyingly magnificent gift is lost once the girl
sees a photograph of herself. She then spends her adult life clothed in a 
black sack, photographing things obsessively. In this way, she is literally 
trying to ‘become a camera’ by making photographs on light-sensitive paper 
inserted into her mouth, with the images produced ‘bathed in the red light’ 
of her body (Image 7). This ambition is later replaced by an attempt to 
‘become a projector’ by creating things ex nihilo through the emanation of 
light. Some of Seers’ films presented in the show are screened in a black hut 
modelled on Thomas Edison’s Black Maria, his New Jersey film studio that 
was used for projection as well as photography. With this, Seers invites us 
not just to witness her process of becoming a camera but also to enter a 
giant camera ourselves, to literally step into the world of imaging, to re-
connect us to the technicity of our own being.  
Although Bergson’s argument about life as a form of imaging is posited as 
transhistorical, we can add a particular inflection to it by returning to 
Flusser, and, in particular, his study of the relation between the human and 
the technical apparatus. For Flusser, that relation changed significantly 
after the Industrial Revolution, a state of events in which ‘photographers 
are inside their apparatus and bound up with it... It is a new kind of 
function in which human beings and apparatus merge into a unity’.264
Consequently, human beings now ‘function as a function of apparatuses’,265
limited as they are to the execution of the camera’s programme from the 
range of seemingly infinite possibilities which are nevertheless determined 
by the machine’s algorithm. Arguably, humans themselves are enactors of 
such a programme, a sequence of possibilities enabled by various couplings 
of adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine, arranged into a double helix of 
life. To state this is not to postulate some kind of uncritical technological or 
biological determinism that would remove from ‘us’ any possibility of action 
– as artists, photographers, critics, or spectators – and any responsibility
for the actions we are to take. It is merely to acknowledge our kinship with 
263 L Seers, Human Camera, Article Press, Birmingham, 2007, p. 36. 264 Flusser, Towards a Philosophy, p. 27. 265 Ibid., p. 26. 
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other living beings across the evolutionary spectrum, with our lives 
remaining subject to biochemical reactions that we cannot always 
understand, control or overcome (from blushing through to ageing and 
dying). Just as ‘the imagination of the camera is greater than that of every 
single photographer and that of all photographers put together’,266 the
imagination of ‘the programme called life’ in which we all participate (and 
which is an outcome of multiple processes running across various scale of 
the universe) far exceeds our human imagination. Such a recognition of our 
entanglement as sentient and discursive beings in complex biological and 
technical networks is necessary if we are to become involved, seriously and 
responsibly, in any kind of photography, philosophy or other critical or 
everyday activity in which we aim to exercise ‘free will’.  
Re-forming the world 
By reconnecting us to the technical apparatus, by letting us explore our 
machinic kinship, artists such as the appropriately named Seers and the 
other image-makers discussed in this article are all engaged (even if they 
are not always up-front about it or perhaps even entirely aware of it) in 
exploring the fundamental problem that many philosophers of technology 
who take science seriously have been grappling with: given that ‘there is no 
place for human freedom within the area of automated, programmed and 
programming  apparatuses’, how can we ‘show a way in which it is 
nevertheless possible to open up a space for freedom’? 267  Such an
undertaking is very much needed, according to Flusser, ‘because it is the 
only form of revolution open to us’.268 Flusser points to ‘envisioners’, that is
‘people who try to turn an automatic apparatus against its own condition of 
being automatic’,269 as those who will be able to undertake the task of
standing ‘against the world’, by pointing ‘at it with their fingertips to inform 
it’.270 In this perspective, codification and visualisation are seen as radical
interventions into the world, and ways of re-forming it, rather than as ways 
of dehumanising it the way Tagg seemed to suggest. 
Any prudent and effective way of envisaging and picturing a 
transformation of our relation to the universe must thus be conducted not 
in terms of a human struggle against the machine but rather in terms of our 
mutual co-constitution, as a recognition of our shared kinship. This 
recognition of the photographic condition that encompasses yet goes 
beyond the human, and of the photographic apparatus that extends well 
beyond our eyes and beyond the devices supposedly under our control, 
should prompt us human philosophers, photographers and spectators to 
266 Ibid., p. 30. 267 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 268 Ibid., p.  82; see also Flusser, Into the Universe, p. 63. 269 Flusser, Into the Universe, p. 19. 270 Ibid., p. 45. 
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mobilise the ongoing creative impulse of life, where the whole world is a 
camera, and put it to creative rather than conservative uses. The conceptual 
expansion of processes of image-making beyond the human can also allow 
us to work towards escaping what Colebrook calls the ‘privatization of the 
eye in late capitalism’,271 where what starts out as a defence of our right to
look often ends up as a defence of our right to look at the small screen. In 
challenging the self-possessive individualism of the human eye, 
photography that seriously and consciously engages with its own expansive 
ontological condition and its nonhuman genealogy may therefore be seen as 
a truly revolutionary practice. Indeed, the concept and practice of 
nonhuman photography reconnects us to other beings and processes across 
the universe: including those of the Taurus Molecular Cloud. It serves as a 
reminder that the short moment in natural history when the human species 
has folded ‘the world around its own, increasingly myopic, point of view’,272
and that has allowed it to become ‘seduced, spellbound, distracted and 
captivated by inanity’,273 should not obscure the wider horizon of our
openness to the world, our relationality with it through originary 
perception. Nonhuman photography can therefore serve as both a response 
to ‘man’s tendency to reify himself’274 and an opening towards a radical
posthumanist political analysis. It can do this by highlighting that there is 
more than just one point of view and that, by tearing the eye from the body 
and embracing the distributed machinic vision, it may be possible to see the 
drone as a more than just a killing machine – although of course there are 
no guarantees.275
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